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SLOCUMB, LYLE, AND EXPERT TESTIMONY IN
SOUTH CAROLINA
I. INTRODUCrION
Nothing in South Carolina evidence law has quite the mantric power as the
"Lyle exception." Indeed, nearly every question of whether evidence of past
bad acts on the part of a defendant may be admitted into evidence turns upon
whether the prosecution can successfully wedge the evidence into one of the
five exceptions to the general inadmissibility of evidence of other crimes first
set forth in State v. Lyle.' This restrictive conception of the admissibility of
evidence of past bad acts is so deeply rooted in South Carolina evidence law
that the South Carolina Rules of Evidence directly reject the inclusive standard
set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence.2 In short, this policy of excluding
evidence of past bad acts with only a handful of narrow exceptions under the
Lyle rule is a fundamental principle of South Carolina evidence law, bolstered
by the weight of over seventy years of precedent.
In August 1999, the South Carolina Court of Appeals arguably added a
sixth exception to this long-standing rule. In State v. Slocumb,3 the trial court
allowed evidence of the defendant's "bad acts while at DJJ [the Department of
Juvenile Justice]" 4 to be heard by the jury during his trial for unrelated charges
of burglary, rape, kidnapping, and armed robbery.5 This evidence of past bad
1. 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923). The Lyle rule states that evidence of other
crimes orbad acts is generally inadmissible to prove the crime charged unless the evidence tends
to establish (1) motive, (2) intent, (3) absence of mistake or accident, (4) a common scheme or
plan, or (5) identity. Id. at 416, 118 S.E. at 807; State v. Nelson, 331 S.C. 1, 6, 501 S.E.2d 716,
718 (1998) (citing Lyle).
2. Compare the language of Federal Rule 404(b) with its "illustrative and not
exclusionary," United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 86 (4th Cir. 1980), list of purposes for
which evidence of other crimes may be admitted with the explicitly restricted list of purposes
found in South Carolina Rule 404(b). See also WALTERA. REISER, JR., SOUTH CAROLINA BAR,
A COMPARISON OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE WITH SOUTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE LAW 19
(5th ed. 1993) (writing in reference to 404(b), "South Carolina follows this rule, except that the
list of purposes for which the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be introduced is not
open-ended, as it is under the Federal Rule."); State v. Gagum, 328 S.C. 560,564 n.2, 492 S.E.2d
822, 823 n.2 (Ct. App. 1997) (noting the distinction between the inclusive Federal Rule 404(b)
and the exclusive South Carolina Rule 404(b)).
South Carolina's Rule 404(b) is virtually the direct codification of the Lyle rule. See
State v. Slocumb, 336 S.C. 619, 632 n.3, 521 S.E.2d 507, 514 n.3 (CL App. 1999), Nelson, 331
S.C. at 6 n.7, 501 S.E.2d at 718 n.7; Gagum, 328 S.C. at 564 n.2, 492 S.E.2d at 823 n.2;. This
Note will use the Lyle rule and Rule 404(b) interchangeably to refer to the same rule of evidence
under South Carolina law.
3. 336 S.C. 619, 521 S.E.2d 507 (Ct. App. 1999).
4. Id. at 624, 521 S.E.2d at 509-10.
5. Id. at 623-25, 521 S.E.2d at 509-10.
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acts was not admitted under any of Lyle's five traditional bases for presenting
past bad act evidence to the jury: (1) to show the defendant's motive for
committing the crime at hand, (2) to demonstrate her criminal intent, (3) to
indicate the absence of mistake or accident in her actions, (4) to suggest a
common scheme or plan of the defendant, or (5) to identify the defendant as the
perpetrator of the crime." Rather, the trial court allowed the prosecution to use
these reports of the defendant's past misbehavior during its cross-examination
of the defendant's expert witness, a psychologist who testified that the
defendant was legally insane at the time of the crime.7
This evidence appears on its face to be inadmissible under the strict
requirements of Lyle because it simply does not fit within any of the listed
exceptions of Rule 404(b). However, the court of appeals, ruling on the issue
for the first time in South Carolina,8 found the evidence admissible based on
South Carolina Rules 7039 and 705,'0 which address the permissible bases of
expert testimony and the disclosure of those bases in court." The court
determined that under Rule 705 evidence of past bad acts upon which an expert
has based his opinion may be disclosed to the jury during the cross-examination
of that expert, subject only to the probative value and prejudicial effect
balancing test of Rule 403." - In so holding, the court noted that the Lyle rule is
simply inapplicable to this situation. 3
This Note will explore the foundations of this decision by evaluating the
structural integrity of the court's analysis and suggesting how, ifnecessary, that
analysis might be reinforced. Part II of this Note will discuss the ruling in State
v. Slocumb, focusing on the court's rationale for its holding and outlining the
authorities it used to buttress its ruling. Part III will address the central question
of this case: Has the South Carolina Court of Appeals created a new Lyle/Rule
404(b) exception? Or, in the alternative, is the court's distinction between the
applicability of a Rule 703 and 705 analysis and the applicability of a Rule
404(b) analysis ultimately convincing? Further, Part IV will examine how
adequately the court's analysis of the admissibility of such evidence guards
against the infringement of the Lyle rule, and the strong policy concerns
expressed therein. Finally, this Note will conclude with a broader evaluation
of both the validity and adequacy of the decision in Slocumb and will offer
some suggestions regarding how South Carolina might modify its position on
this issue in the future.
6. Id. at 625, 521 S.E.2d at 510.
7. Id. at 626, 521 S.E.2d at 511.
8. Id. at 629,521 S.E.2d at 512 ("Our research reveals no South Carolina cases which
deal with the precise issue raised in this case.").
9. S.C. R. EvID. 703.
10. S.C. R. EVID. 705.
11. Slocumb, 336 S.C. at 631-33, 521 S.E.2d at 513-14.
12. Id. at 632-33, 521 S.E.2d at 514-15.
13. Id. at 632, 521 S.E.2d at 514.
Vol. 51: 983
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I. STATE V. SLOCUMB
On March 6, 1996, Conrad Slocumb, an inmate at the DJJ, escaped from
a corrections officer while returning to DJJ from a doctor's office.' 4 Slocumb
fled to a nearby apartment complex where he forced his way into the apartment
of a female resident. 5 Once inside, he told the victim that he had a gun and
threatened to shoot her if she did not give him money, her car keys, and a
change of clothes. 6 The victim did as she was asked.' 7 Slocumb then raped the
victim and stole jewelry from her bedroom.' After approximately forty
minutes, Slocumb left the victim's apartment. 9 He was apprehended shortly
thereafter in the parking lot of the apartment complex." The Richland County
Grand Jury indicted Slocumb for first degree burglary, first degree criminal
sexual conduct, kidnapping, armed robbery, and escape.2'
At trial, Slocumb asserted an insanity defense to all charges and called Dr.
James Merikangas, an expert witness in neurology and psychiatry, to testify
regarding Slocumb's mental capacity atthe time of the crime. Dr. Merikangas
testified that "Slocumb had organic brain abnormalities as the result of a head
injury that he suffered as a child;" that, as a result of that injury, Slocumb had
a "'chronic, long-standing' mental illness;" and that, consequently, Slocumb
"was legally insane at the time he committed the offenses for which he was on
trial." ' In formulating this opinion, Dr. Merikangas performed medical tests
on Slocumb and reviewed "numerous reports and records which included
interviews with Slocumb's family members, DJJ psychiatric records, DJJ
service notes and behavior reports, DJJ medication and medical records, State
hospital evaluations," and the evaluations of several other doctors.24 He also
interviewed Slocumb and conducted a neurological examination on him.'
In its cross-examination, the prosecution, over the objection of defense
counsel, questioned Dr. Merikangas regarding his use of Slocumb's DJJ
incident reports in evaluating Slocumb's mental condition.26 As a part of this
questioning, the assistant solicitor read excerpts from the DJJ incident reports.27
14. Id. at 622, 521 S.E.2d at 509.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 622-23, 521 S.E.2d at 509.




22. Id. at 623, 625-26, 521 S.E.2d at 509, 510-11.




27. Id. While the court never fully described the content of these reports, it did state
that the reports "detailed numerous incidents of Slocumb's inappropriate sexual
behavior.... [including) sexually graphic comments and letters and sexual conduct directed at
2000
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In response to this cross-examination, Dr. Merikangas testified that he had seen
the reports prior to the trial, but that the incidents described therein did not
affect his opinion regarding Slocumb's sanity.28 At the conclusion of the trial,
the jury found Slocumb guilty of all charges except the armed robbery count,
on which the jury instead found Slocumb guilty of common law robbery.29
On appeal Slocumb asserted two interrelated objections to the trial court's
admission of the DJJ incident reports. 30 First, Slocumb claimed that the reports
were inadmissible under Lyle as improper evidence of past bad acts.3' Second,
Slocumb argued that the reports should have been excluded as unfairly
prejudicial under Rule 403.32 The South Carolina Court of Appeals, reviewing
the trial court's actions only for an abuse of discretion, rejected both of these
arguments. 3 To the court, the admission of evidence of past bad acts in the
cross-examination of an expert witness is properly analyzed under South
Carolina Rules 703 and 705, not under Lyle/Rule 404(b). 34 Further, the court
found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the
probative value of that evidence outweighed any unfair prejudicial impact.35
To reach this conclusion, the court held that, read together, Rule 70336 and
Rule 7053' broadly grant admissibility to the evidence of past bad acts sought
to be introduced by the prosecution in its cross-examination of Dr.
otherjuvenile inmates and DJJ staffmembers." Id. at 625, 521 S.E.2d at 510.
28. Id. at 626, 631,521 S.E.2d at 511, 514.
29. Id. at 623, 521 S.E.2d at 509.
30. Id. at 624, 521 S.E.2d at 509-10. In his appeal, Slocumb also raised an objection
to the prosecution's use of an MRI report that Dr. Merikangas did not rely upon in forming his
opinion to impeach his testimony on cross-examination. Id. at 634,521 S.E.2d at 515. While the
court of appeals did find the trial court's admission of this report in cross-examination of Dr.
Merikangas to be error, it further held that such error was harmless as the erroneous admission
of the report was merely cumulative to properly admitted evidence. Id. at 639,521 S.E.2d at5 19.
This Note does not address this second issue raised by Slocumb on appeal.
31. Id. at 624, 521 S.E.2d at 509-10
32. Id. at 624, 521 S.E.2d at 510.
33. Id. at 632-33, 521 S.E.2d at 514.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 633, 521 S.E.2d at 514.
36. South Carolina Rule 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
perceived by or made known to the expert at or
before the hearing. Ifofa type reasonably relied upon
by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need
not be admissible in evidence.
37. South Carolina Rule 705 provides:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or
inference and give reasons therefor without first
testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the
courtrequires otherwise. The expertmay in any event
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Merikangas. s Dr. Merikangas had properly relied upon the reports in
formulating his opinion and the reports were properly used to cross-examine
him on the bases of that opinion. Thus, whether the reports would be
admissible as direct, substantive evidence is irrelevant under Rule 703 and Rule
705.39 The court further held that the admission of such evidence is limited by
the probative value and prejudicial effect balancing test of Rule 403 of the
South Carolina Rules of Evidence. ° Here, the relevance of these reports to a
proper cross-examination of the expert witness lent the reports a probative
value that arguably outweighed any unfair prejudicial effect of those reports.41
As to the Lyle objection raised by the defense, the court rejected any
conflict between the admission of the DJJ reports in cross-examination under
Rule 705 and the general inadmissibility of evidence of past bad acts spelled
out in Rule 404(b).42 First, the court found the language of Rule 404(b) to apply
only when past bad acts are admitted as improper character evidence to prove
the commission of the crime charged.43 In the present case, "the evidence [of
past bad acts] was not offered to prove the crimes for which Slocumb was
charged or to prove Slocumb had a propensity to commit these
crimes .... [instead] the evidence was elicited as part of proper cross-
examination of Dr. Merikanga's opinion that Slocumb was insane."
Accordingly, that evidence did not constitute the improper character evidence
prohibited by Rule 404(b).45 Second, the court noted on a more pragmatic level
that the prosecution had not infringed upon the strictures of Rule 404(b)
because the prosecution "in its case-in-chief did not refer to [the] incident
reports, nor did it attempt to admit Slocumb's prior criminal sexual conduct
conviction for which he was incarcerated at DJJ."' In sum, the court found that
the prosecution had neither introduced nor used the evidence of Slocumb's past
bad acts for the improper purposes defined in Rule 404(b).
38. Slocumb, 336 S.C. at 631-33, 521 S.E.2d at 513-14. However, as mentioned
above, see supra note 8, this issue is one of first impression in South Carolina, and as a result,
the court's analysis relied heavily upon two Fourth Circuit cases. Id. at 629-31, 521 S.E.2d at
512-13. (interpreting United States v. Gillis, 773 F.2d 549 (4th Cir. 1985) and United States v.
A & S Council Oil Co., 947 F.2d 1128 (4th Cir. 1991)). The opinion also cites case law reaching
analogous results from Arizona, Hawaii, New Jersey, North Carolina, and West Virginia. Id. at
633-34, 521 S.E.2d at 515.
39. Slocumb, 536 S.C. at 628, 521 S.E.2d at 512.
40. Id. at 633, 521 S.E.2d at 514.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 632, 521 S.E.2d at 514.
43. Id.; see S.C. R. EVID. 404(b) (providing that "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith").
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Finding Slocumb's objections to the admission of the DJJ incident reports
to be unjustified under the South Carolina Rules of Evidence, the court of
appeals affirmed his convictions from the court below. 7
III. A NEW LYLE EXCEPTION?
The core issue raised by the Slocumb case is whether the South Carolina
Court of Appeals created a new, sixth exception to the general inadmissibility
of evidence of past bad acts under South Carolina law. A full response to this
question necessitates a three-part analysis of the court's decision in Slocumb
and how that decision comports with prior South Carolina evidence law. First,
as a threshold matter, it must be determined whether a genuine conflict exists
between the "Slocumb rule" and the Lyle rule regarding the admissibility of the
evidence of past bad acts in question. If the two rules do not conflict-if, for
example, the SlocumblRule 705 analysis is applicable only to this
evidence-then the court's decision in Slocumb does not create a new
exception to the Lyle rule. Rather, Slocumb would simply cover a sphere of
evidentiary decisions unrelated to those governed by Lyle/Rule 404(b).
However, if such a conflict does exist and the evidentiary concerns covered by
each rule do overlap, then two questions follow. First, did the court, in sorting
out that conflict, create an exception to one of the rules? Second, if such an
exception was created, is that exception a valid extension of existing law?
A. Slocumb versus Lyle
In Slocumb the court of appeals found no conflict exists between the
admission of evidence under Rule 705 and the strictures of the Lyle rule.48 To
the court, the admission on cross-examination of the facts or data underlying
an expert opinion as governed by Rule 705 is an evidentiary decision that falls
beyond the scope of Lyle and Rule 404(b).4 9 The determinative factor for the
court in reaching this conclusion is the purpose for which the evidence of past
bad acts is to be used at trial.50
The Slocumb court primarily relied upon the following formulation of the
Lyle rule found in State v. Peake" to describe those uses of past bad acts
evidence that Lyle holds to be inadmissible: "Evidence of prior criminal acts
which are independent and unconnected to the crime for which an accused is
on trial is inadmissible for purposes of proving that the accused possesses a
criminal character or has a propensity to commit the crime for which he is
47. Id. at 641,521 S.E.2d at 519.
48. Id. at 632, 521 S.E.2d at 514.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 302 S.C. 378, 396 S.E.2d 362 (1990).
Vol. 51: 983
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charged."' 2 The court later implicitly defined the impermissible uses of
evidence of past bad acts to include offering evidence "to prove the crimes for
which [the defendant] was charged orto prove [the defendant] had apropensity
to commit these crimes."53 Thus, under this conception of the Lyle rule,
evidence of past bad acts maybe introduced for any relevant purpose other than
to "prove" the crime charged orprove the defendant has apropensity to commit
such crimes. The court of appeals applied this conception of the Lyle rule to the
admission of the DJJ reports in Slocumb. Because the evidence of Slocumb's
past bad acts was properly introduced to cross-examine an expert witness under
Rule 705, the court found that its admission did not implicate the Lyle rule.54
This interpretation of the Lyle rule is not without textual support in South
Carolina law, nor without analogous support from the law of other
jurisdictions. A purely literal reading of Rule 404(b) would suggest the same
result as that reached by the court of appeals."5 On its face, Rule 404(b) seems
only to preclude evidence of past bad acts when introduced to demonstrate the
character of a person "in order to show action in conformity therewith," and
thus appears to allow evidence of past bad acts introduced for other, non-
character-related purposes, such as the cross-examination of an expert witness,
to be freely admissible.56 Likewise, several formulations of the Lyle rule in
South Carolina case law use language that tends to support the Slocumb court's
broad reading of Lyle."7 Further, each of the other jurisdictions the court relied
upon in making its determination allows evidence of other crimes to be
introduced for any relevant purpose other than an improper character
inference.58
52. Slocumb, 336 S.C. at 632 n.3, 521 S.E.2d at 514 n.3 (quoting Peake, 302 S.C. at
380, 396 S.E.2d at 363).
53. Slocumb, 336 S.C. at 632, 521 S.E.2d at 514.
54. Id.
55. South Carolina Rule of Evidence 404(b) reads:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. Itmay, however, be admissible
to show motive, identity, the existence of a common
scheme orplan, the absence ofmistake or accident, or
intent.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 331 S.C. 1, 6, 501 S.E.2d 716, 718 (1998)
("[E]vidence of other crimes or bad acts is generally inadmissible to prove the crime
charged .... "); State v. Adams, 322 S.C. 114, 118, 470 S.E.2d 366, 368 (1996) ("South
Carolina law precludes evidence of a defendant's prior crimes or other bad acts to prove the
defendant's guilt for the crime charged .... "); State v. Peake, 302 S.C. 378, 380, 396 S.E.2d
362, 363 (1990) (ruling that "[e]vidence of prior criminal acts.., is inadmissible for
purposes of proving that the accused possesses a criminal character or has a propensity to
commit the crime with which he is charged").
58. See United States v. Gillis, 773 F.2d 549 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. A & S
Council Oil Co., 947 F.2d 1128 (4th Cir. 1991); State v. Stabler, 783 P.2d 816 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1989); State v. Samuel, 838 P.2d 1374 (Haw. 1992); State v. Clowney, 690 A.2d 612 (N.J.
2000
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Nonetheless, the justification the court of appeals offered for its conclusion
is suspect on at least two grounds. First, it is not entirely clear that the evidence
of other crimes being offered in cross-examination of the defendant's expert
witness goes solely to probe the basis of that expert's opinion and not for a
purpose covered under Rule 404(b). Indeed, even in the limited context of
cross-examination, this evidence does, in a very important way, go to prove the
crime charged. Second, the court's reading of Rule 404(b) as allowing evidence
of past bad acts so long as that evidence is not used to prove the crime charged
or to show the character of the defendant does not seem to comport with the
restrictive, exclusive interpretation generally given to the Lyle rule. 9
The court of appeals rested its analysis of the admissibility of Slocumb's
past bad acts on the grounds that the DJJ incident reports were "elicited as part
of proper cross-examination of Dr. Merikangas's opinion that Slocumb was
insane" and that "[t]he State's cross-examination [was] focused on establishing
that Slocumb was sane, and the records were directly related to an evaluation
of Slocumb's state of mind."' 6 To the court, these details indicated that the
reports were admitted to probe the bases and test the validity of an expert
opinion, not to prove Slocumb's commission of the crime or to show his
criminal propensity."
The matter is not quite so simple. Even leaving aside questions of improper
or prejudicial inferences potentially made by the jury and accepting the use of
these reports in the limited setting of cross-examination, the prosecution's use
of these DJJ incident reports directly goes to prove Slocumb's "guilt for the
crime charged,"'62 and may go indirectly to show an impermissible character
inference. The prosecution introduced the DJJ reports to directly challenge Dr.
Merikangas's opinion that Slocumb was insane at the time of the crime.63 The
prosecution was then, in effect, arguing that Slocumb was in fact sane at the
time of the crime. Beyond questioning the basis of Dr. Merikangas's opinion,
such an argument tends to establish a critical part of the proof necessary to find
Slocumb guilty of the crime charged: whether Slocumb had the requisite
1997); State v. Lyons, 468 S.E.2d 204 (N.C. 1996); State v. DeGraw, 470 S.E.2d 215 (W. Va.
1996). In all of these cases but one (State v. DeGraw), evidence of past bad acts on the part of
the defendantwas admitted duringtheprosecution's cross-examination ofthe defendant's expert
witness without the mere suggestion ofa potential conflict with Rule 404(b), whether the Federal
version or the state equivalent (all of which are substantively similar to the Federal rule in these
jurisdictions). See ARIz. R. EVID. 404(b); HAw. R. EVID. 404(b); N.J. R. EVID. 404(b); N.C.R.
EVID. 404(b); W.VA. R. EVID. 404(b). InDeGraw, the issue of a potential conflict between Rule
705 and 404(b) was not reviewed by the appellate court because the defense had not properly
preserved the claim of error from the trial court. DeGraw, 470 S.E.2d at 226.
59. See Reiser, supra note 2, at 19.
60. Slocumb, 336 S.C. at 632, 521 S.E.2d at 514.
61. Id.
62. Adams, 322 S.C. at 118, 470 S.E.2d at 368.
63. Slocumb, 336 S.C. at 632, 521 S.E.2d at 514.
Vol. 51: 983
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mental capacity to commit the crime. 64 Here, the prosecution is clearly using
evidence of Slocumb's past bad acts to prove, albeit not in its case-in-chief,
Slocumb's responsibility for the alleged crime, and such a use of evidence of
other crimes is arguably governed by Lyle. 65
Even if one accepts as valid the distinction the court of appeals made
between introducing evidence of past bad acts for the purpose of cross-
examining an expert and introducing such evidence for the purpose of proving
the defendant's guilt or bad character, this distinction may be essentially
meaningless when determining admissibility under Lyle, unless that proposed
use implicates at least one of the five exceptions to Lyle. The Slocumb court
basically treated South Carolina's Rule 404(b) as an inclusive rule like its
counterpart in the Federal Rules of Evidence, and determined that, because the
evidence of Slocumb's past bad acts was used for a purpose that did not
involve an improper character inference, the admission of that evidence did not
implicate the Lyle rule.' However, South Carolina's Rule 404(b) is distinctly
exclusionary. Rather than simply giving a list of examples of permissible
purposes (i.e., relevant, non-character related purposes) for which evidence of
64. Indeed, under South Carolina law, "when the defendant offers evidence of
insanity, the presumption [of sanity] disappears and it is [i]ncumbent on the State to present
evidence from which ajury could find the defendant sane." State v. Milian-Hemandez, 287 S.C.
183, 185, 336 S.E.2d 476, 477 (1985). With this burden, the prosecution's reading of the reports
of the defendant's past bad acts to the jury seems more akin to "proving" the crime charged than
merely attacking the credibility of an expert witness.
65. See State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 416, 118 S.E. 803, 807 (1923) ("evidence of other
distinct crimes committed by the accused may not be adduced merely to raise an inference or to
corroborate the prosecution's theory ofthe defendant's guilt of the particular crime charged")
(emphasis added).
This argument is not meant to categorically reject the position taken by the court of
appeals. A use of evidence of past bad acts that did not go so directly toward proving the guilt
of the accused might better support a claim that the evidence of other crimes is being used for
a purpose not governed by Lyle. For example, the use of evidence of past bad acts dissimilar to
the crime charged merely to negate an expert opinion on cross-examination (e.g., using the
evidence to show that the expert did not have enough credible information upon which to base
an opinion) would be much easier to place beyond the scope of Lyle than the use of evidence
used in Slocumb-evidence of prior bad acts similar to the crime charged that is used to make
a positive argument (i.e. that Slocumb was sane) on a matter central to proving the guilt of the
defendant. See Slocumb, 336 S.C. at 632, 521 S.E.2d at 514 ("The State's cross-examination
focused on establishing that Slocumb was sane .... .") (emphasis added).
66. Id. The court's analysis would clearly be correct if the admissibility of the past
bad acts evidence was governed by Federal Rule 404(b) or its substantive equivalent. See, e.g.,
United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 85-86 (4th Cir. 1980) (noting that Federal Rule 404(b)
"'admits all evidence of other crimes (or acts) relevant to an issue in a trial except that which
tends to prove only criminal disposition' and that the list of permissible purposes therein "is
merely illustrative and not exclusionary"); United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 766 (3d Cir.
1978) ("The draftsmen of Rule 404(b) intended it to be construed as one of 'inclusion,' and not
'exclusion'. . . . [T]hey intended to emphasize admissibility of 'other crime' evidence"); State
v. Wood, 881 P.2d 1158, 1167 (Ariz. 1994) (noting that the list of permissible purposes for
introducing evidence of other crimes under ARiz. R. EVID. 404(b) (which is substantively
identical to the Federal Rule) "is merely illustrative, not exclusive").
2000
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past bad acts can be introduced, the South Carolina rule acts as a positive rule
of relevancy and limits the permissible purposes for the introduction of
evidence of past bad acts to demonstrating "motive, identity, the existence of
a common scheme or plan, the absence of mistake or accident, or intent."'67
Thus, under South Carolina law, evidence of past bad acts is inadmissible
regardless of the purpose for which it is introduced, unless that purpose
complies with Lyle and Rule 404(b). Admitting evidence for the sole purpose
of cross-examining an expert witness, as allowed under Rule 705, appears to
directly conflict with Lyle, because such a purpose is not recognized in the
exceptions to Lyle.
In sum, it is clear that a direct and substantial conflict exists between the
standard for admitting past bad act evidence under Rule 705 and the standard
for such admission under Lyle.
B. The Creation of a Lyle Exception
Having determined that a conflict does exist between Rule 705 and Rule
404(b), the question remains regarding whether, in resolving this conflict, the
court of appeals created a new exception to the Lyle rule in Slocumb. Given the
court's decision to admit the evidence of Slocumb's past bad acts under Rule
705 over a Lyle objection,68 it appears that the court has created a sixth Lyle
exception.
If one accepts the proposition that Lyle limits evidence of past bad acts to
five exceptions,69 and that the evidence of other crimes introduced against
67. S.C. R. EVID. 404(b). Note the clear absence in the South Carolina rule of the
"such as" language of Federal Rule 404(b).
Courts and commentators alike have consistently recognized the exclusionary nature
of the South Carolina rule. See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 331 S.C. 1, 6, 501 S.E.2d 716, 718 (1998)
("[E]vidence of other crimes or bad acts is generally inadmissible to prove the crime charged
unless the evidence tends to establish (1) motive, (2) intent, (3) absence of mistake or accident,
(4) a common scheme or plan, or (5) identity"); State v. Adams, 322 S.C. 114, 118, 470 S.E.2d
366,368 (1996) ("South Carolina law precludes evidence of a defendant's prior crimes or other
bad acts to prove the defendant's guilt for the crime charged except to establish (I) motive, (2)
intent, (3) absence of mistake or accident, (4) a common scheme or plan, or (5) identity."); State
v. Brooks, 235 S.C. 344,350, 111 S.E.2d 686,689 (1959) ("Ordinarily, in a criminal prosecution
evidence of his commission of another, independent crime is not admissible against the
defendant if he objects."); Lyle, 125 S.C. at 416, 118 S.E. at 807 ("[E]vidence of other crimes
is competent to prove the specific crime when it tends to establish (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the
absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan... ; (5) the identity of the person
charged.... ."); JusTiN KAHN, SoUTH CAROLINA EvIDENCE HANDBOOK ANNOTATED 15 (1998)
(noting that "unlike the federal rule which does not limit the purposes for which evidence of
other crimes may be admitted, the South Carolina rule limits the use of evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts to those enumerated in [Lyle]"); REISER, supra note 2, at 19 ("South Carolina
follows this rule [404(b)], except that the list of purposes for which the evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts may be introduced is not open-ended, as it is under the Federal Rule.").
68. Slocumb, 336 S.C. at 632, 521 S.E.2d at 514.
69. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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Slocumb does not fit into one of those exceptions,7" then the admission of the
evidence of Slocumb's past bad acts at trial can be construed in only two
possible ways: (1) as a mistaken interpretation of the law on the part of the
court; or (2) as a decision to create a new exception to Lyle. Here, the first of
these possible interpretations of the court's action is patently inapplicable-the
court undertook a studied analysis of the law on this point and certainly did not
fail to consider Lyle and Rule 404(b) in forming its opinion.7 Therefore, the
Slocumb court, in deliberately allowing evidence of Slocumb's past bad acts to
be introduced for a purpose not permitted under the current formulation of the
Lyle rule, did indeed create a new exception to Lyle.72
C. The Validity of the New Lyle Exception
Assessing the validity of this new exception to Lyle is a difficult
proposition. South Carolina courts concern themselves much more frequently
with the question of whether aparticular piece of evidence falls properly within
one of the Lyle exceptions than with the question of whether that list of
exceptions should be expanded. However, those rare comments of South
Carolina courts that do shed some light on the issue of whether Lyle should be
expanded lend themselves to the conclusion that such new exceptions are not
to be created lightly, if at all.
70. Slocumb's DJJ incident reports were introduced regarding the issue of his sanity
at the time of the commission of the crime. Slocumb, 336 S.C. at 632, 521 S.E.2d at 514. The
resolution of this issue does not implicate several of the Lyle exceptions: Slocumb's "identity"
as the perpetrator of the crime was not contested; it was not argued that the attack was a "mistake
or accident"; and a "common scheme orplan" was not alleged. While the evidence of Slocumb's
other inappropriate sexual behavior might seem to border on this "common scheme" exception,
the previous DJJ incidents are clearly not similar enough to the alleged crime to meet the high
standard required for the admission of other crimes evidence under this exception. See, e.g., State
v. Carter, 323 S.C. 465,467,476 S.E.2d 916, 918 (Ct. App. 1996).
The issue of Slocumb's sanity might seem to fall close to the Lyle exceptions of either
"motive" or "intent." However, it must be remembered that insanity is entered not to dispute the
substantive elements of the crime but as an affirmative defense. See State v. Lewis, 328 S.C. 273,
277, 494 S.E.2d 115, 117 (1997); 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 100 (1989). Therefore, the issue at
trial is not whether Slocumb had a motive to commit the crime or whether he committed the
crime with the required intent, but rather, whether he did in fact "lack sufficient mental capacity
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." Slocumb, 336 S.C. at 626, 521 S.E.2d
at 511. In short, the DJJ reports do not fit into any of the five Lyle exceptions.
71. See id. at 632, 521 S.E.2d at 514.
72. Depending upon how one chooses to read the Slocumb opinion, this potential sixth
exception can be conceived either very narrowly (strictly tailoring the exception to the precise
holding of the case and limiting the exception to the admission of other crimes evidence for
cross-examination under Rule 705) or quite broadly (using the court's implication that evidence
of past bad acts is admissible as long as it is not used to "prove" the crime charged or the
character of the accused to expand the Lyle rule nearly to the same level of inclusiveness as the
Federal Rule). Given the strictures of the Lyle rule, the first of these possible interpretations
would seem to be the preferred interpretation of the exception created in Slocumb.
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An analogous problem to the one faced by the Slocumb court was
presented to the court of appeals in State v. Gagum.73 In Gagum, the court
addressed the question of whether the common law resgestae exception to the
general inadmissibility of evidence of past bad acts survived the adoption of
Rule 404(b).74 The court was faced with a conflict between "South Carolina's
version of Rule 404(b) ... [that] allows the admission of evidence of prior
crimes or bad acts only if the evidence shows [one of the Lyle exceptions]" and
the long-standing res gestae exception to the inadmissibility of other crimes
evidence that, while clearly not listed as an exception under Lyle, might "be
properly viewed as independent of Lyle."75 While the court of appeals did not
resolve the conflict between these two competing evidentiary doctrines,76 and
although the Gagum decision does not suggest any analytical framework for
making such a decision, some important insights into the sort of rigor required
to make an exception to Lyle can be gleaned from the court's discussion of the
problem. Indeed, what is most striking about the Gagum decision is that despite
the existence of South Carolina precedent for the res gestae exception,77 the
general admissibility of res gestae evidence under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 8 and language from the South Carolina Supreme Court indicating
that the res gestae exception might fall outside the scope of Lyle,7" the question
of "whether, given Rule 404(b)'s strict limitation of when evidence of other
crimes is admissible, the doctrine of res gestae remains viable under the South
Carolina Rules of Evidence" was a question that the court could not easily
resolve."0
The problem raised in Gagum, however, is distinguishable from that raised
in Slocumb in several ways. First, Gagum involves a conflict between a pre-
existing common law doctrine and newly-adopted Rules of Evidence, whereas
Slocumb involves a conflict within the Rules of Evidence themselves. It is far
easier to argue that one rule of a comprehensive code of rules is inherently
limited by another applicable rule in that same code than to decide to what
extent such a set of rules pre-empts a portion of the common law. Second,
Gagum deals with an exception to the inadmissibility of other crimes evidence
73. 328 S.C. 560,492 S.E.2d 822 (Ct. App. 1997).
74. Id. at 564 n.2, 492 S.E.2d at 823 n2.
75. Id. The concept of res gestae has been defined as follows: the "collection of
primary facts constituting the necessary and immediate field of a judicial inquiry may be
designated as the res gestae, and within this field of immediate inquiry the court will receive
evidence of all the facts." 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 342 (1996).
76. The court felt compelled to leave the issue unresolved because not only had the
South Carolina Supreme Court not "address[ed] the effect of the adoption of the Rules [of
Evidence] on the viability of the doctrine [i.e., res gestae]," but also Gagum had "never argued
at trial that res gestae did not survive the adoption of the Rules of Evidence. .. ." Gagum, 328
S.C. at 564 n.2, 492 S.E.2d at 823 n.2.
77. Id.
78. Id.; see Masters, 622 F.2d at 86-87.
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that has a higher potential for the introduction of unfair prejudice than the
exception discussed in Slocumb. It stands to reason that ajury would be more
likely to co-mingle res gestae evidence of the circumstances surrounding a
crime with the alleged crime itself when determining the guilt of a defendant
than to allow such improper prejudice to color its evaluation of evidence of the
more remote "bad acts" that often form the bases of expert opinions. Third, the
Gagum court did not actually resolve the issue of whether the res gestae
doctrine survived the adoption of Rule 404(b),"' and, therefore, one cannot
determine whether the Slocumb court's resolution of the problem put before it
conflicts with the way in which the Gagum court would have resolved the
issue.
Nonetheless, the Gagum opinion does have relevance to an evaluation of
the Slocumb decision. While Slocumb does involve a conflict within the Rules
of Evidence, like Gagum, it also involves the resolution of a conflict between
those Rules and a long-standing common law evidentiary doctrine. The
Slocumb court and the Gagum court faced similar complexities in their attempts
to balance the language of the Rules of Evidence against the precedential
weight of the common law. Further, regardless of the relative prejudicial effects
of various sorts of res gestae and past bad acts evidence, it seems likely that
evidence admitted under Slocumb merely to challenge an expert opinion would
have less relevance towards proving the crime charged than res gestae evidence
that places the commission of the crime in its proper factual context. If this
highly relevant res gestae evidence is suspect under Rule 404(b), what then of
evidence of other crimes that is distinctly less relevant to an adequate
presentation of the prosecution's case such as that used in the cross-
examination of an expert witness? Finally, while the Gagum court did not
eventually make a decision on the conflict between the res gestae doctrine and
Rule 404(b), this indecision alone indicates that the resolution of such a conflict
is not an act to be taken lightly by the courts. In short, the issues faced by the
Gagum court are sufficiently similar to those dealt with by the court of appeals
in Slocumb that the latter ought to have recognized the Gagum opinion as
recommending, if not implicitly requiring, the use of a greater degree of caution
in creating exceptions to Lyle and Rule 404(b) than that found in the Slocumb
82opinion.
Beyond Gagum, South Carolina courts have indicated that the Lyle rule is
intended to be only a limited exception to the general inadmissibility of
evidence of past bad acts, and that the boundaries of the Lyle rule are to be
strictly construed. Indeed, in Lyle itself, the court noted that "the dangerous
tendency and misleading probative force of this class of evidence [evidence of
81. Id.
82. Note that the Slocumb court addressed and resolved its conflict between Rule 705
and Lyle with half the amount of discussion that the Gagum court used merely to raise the issue
of a conflict between the res gestae doctrine and Rule 404(b). See Slocumb, 336 S.C. at 632, 521
S.E.2d at 514; Gagum, 328 S.C. at 564 n.2, 492 S.E.2d at 823 n.2.
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past bad acts] require that its admission should be subjected by the courts to
rigid scrutiny." 3 The Lyle court was willing to adopt five exceptions to the
inadmissibility of evidence of other crimes, but it equally recognized that any
exceptions to the rule should be carefully guarded by the court for fear of the
abuse of these exceptions." As one commentatorhas noted, the South Carolina
Supreme Court has followed its own mandate to strictly construe the Lyle
exceptions: "Since Lyle," the supreme court has applied this rule strictly,
testing the evidence in each case on the basis of whether or not it is relevant to
any one of the enumerated exceptions.""5 Clearly, the Lyle exceptions are not
to be loosely applied. Even as recently as 1996, the court of appeals felt
compelled to warn trial judges against such loose applications of the Lyle
exceptions:
We can appreciate the difficulties encountered by trial judges
in charting the amorphous area of the law created by the Lyle
exceptions. When motive, intent, common scheme or plan,
lack of accident or mistake, or identity cannot be shown by
other means, Lyle can be used to provide a link between the
prior bad act and the crime for which the defendant is being
tried. However, Lyle is intended only to provide an exception
to the general rule of inadmissibility.6
South Carolina courts have recognized that the Lyle rule is one of limited
applicability to be used only for the narrow purposes for which it was intended.
Thus, the addition of new exceptions should only be attempted when absolutely
necessary and after the most searching of legal analyses. It is not clear that the
Slocumb court acted with such caution in its adoption of a new exception to the
Lyle rule; consequently, the Slocumb court's decision to broaden Lyle should
be viewed with some concern.
IV. THE ADEQUACY OF THE SLOCUMB SOLUTION
Another issue arising from the Slocumb decision involves whether the
decision adequately protects the policy concerns that underlie Lyle. Certainly
the court of appeals was bound to take into consideration the "inevitable
tendency of such evidence.., to raise a legally spurious presumption of guilt
83. Lyle, 125 S.C. at 417, 118 S.E. at 807.
84. For example, if the court does not "clearly perceive" the relevance of the
proffered evidence of past bad acts, the Lyle court held that "the accused should be given the
benefit of the doubt, and the evidence should be rejected." Id.
85. Walter A. Reiser, Jr., Evidence of Other CriminalActs in South Carolina, 28 S.C.
L. Rav. 125, 126 (1976).
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in the minds of the jurors""7 when crafting its standard for the admission of
other crimes evidence in the cross-examination of expert witnesses.
This is no idle concern. The circumstances that gave rise to Slocumb are
capable of repetition in nearly every case in which a defendant asserts an
insanity defense. Indeed, because insanity is an affirmative defense, the burden
of proof on the issue is placed first upon the defendant to rebut the legal
presumption of sanity.8" While the defendant may establish insanity with lay
testimony," often the more effective course involves the use of expert
testimony." However, once the defendant has successfully rebutted that
presumption of sanity, the burden then shifts to the prosecution to present
evidence of sanity.9' Thus, through this mechanism of shifting burdens, the
assertion of an insanity defense must lead quite often to a situation like that in
Slocumb, where the defendant is compelled to present expert testimony to
satisfy his burden of proof and the prosecution is compelled to challenge that
testimony with evidence sufficient to meet its burden.
The risk of the improper introduction of past bad acts evidence is greatest
during the cross-examination of the defendant's expert witness. The defendant
surely wants an expert opinion that is procedurally sound enough to withstand
credibility attacks based upon the methodology used by the expert. With regard
to psychological evaluations, proper methodology includes the consideration
of the defendant's past bad acts, whether found in official records like prison
reports or in more intimate sources such as family interviews. Yet, while the
defendant does want his expert to be credible, he does not wish to see his Lyle
protection against the introduction of other crimes evidence waived by his use
of this credible psychological expert.
The prosecution, on the other hand, has a strong interest not only in
effectively challenging the bases of the opinion given by the defendant's
psychological expert, but also in presenting as much evidence of the
defendant's sanity as possible. In nearly every insanity case both sides will
want to use evidence of the defendant's past bad acts in some fashion. The
court must decide just what uses of such evidence are permissible and what
uses are impermissible so that the interests of both the State and the criminal
defendant are adequately protected.
87. Lyle, 125 S.C. at 417, 118 S.E. at 807.
88. See State v. Milian-Hemandez, 287 S.C. 183, 185, 336 S.E.2d 476,477 (1985);
State v. Lewis, 328 S.C. 273,277,494 S.E.2d 115, 117 (1997).
89. Lewis, 328 S.C. at 278,494 S.E.2d at 117.
90. The defendant's own assessment of his mental state and the testimony of lay
witnesses are often insufficient to rebut the presumption of sanity and to establish that the
defendant could not distinguish between right and wrong. See id. at 278-79,494 S.E.2d at 117.
91. Milian-Hernandez, 287 S.C. at 185, 336 S.E.2d at 477. The State must take care
to meet this burden because the failure of the State to present enough evidence of sanity to create
ajury question is grounds for a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. Id. at 186, 336 S.E.2d
at 477-78 (holding that a directed verdict was appropriate where the only evidence presented by
the State to contradict the defendant's showing of insanity was evidence of the defendant's flight
from the crime scene and the legal presumption of sanity).
2000 EVIDENCE
15
Werner: Slocumb, Lyle, and Expert Testimony in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 2000
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The Slocumb court's solution to this problem seems to adequately protect
these interests. Regardless of the validity of the decision to circumventLyle, the
Slocumb opinion establishes adequate safeguards regarding the admission of
evidence of past bad acts so that neither the State's interest in a proper cross-
examination of the defendant's witnesses nor the defendant's interest in
preserving the evidentiary protections that lie at the root of Lyle are
significantly infringed.
A. Rule 403
As the Slocumb court noted early in its analysis, "[e]ven if admissible
under Rule 703 or Rule 705 ... the determination of whether an expert may
testify to the facts underlying an opinion must include an analysis under Rule
403, SCRE."' Courts and commentators have agreed with the Slocumb court
that the admission of evidence under Rule 705 should be limited by the
probative value versus prejudicial effect balancing test of Rule 403."3 Thus, the
court has broad power under Rule 403 to prevent evidence of past bad acts that
underlie an expert's opinion from being revealed during cross-examination if
the probative value of that revelation is outweighed by the prejudicial impact
of the evidence of other crimes on the jury, by the potential confusion of issues
that the evidence might create with the jury, or even by considerations of time
and necessity.9'
B. Rule 705
As the Slocumb court notes, cross-examination of an expert with regard to
the bases of his opinion under Rule 705 ensures fairness in the use of expert
testimony.95 It would be fundamentally unfair to allow one party to introduce
92. Slocumb, 336 S.C. at 627, 521 S.E.2d at 511. S.C. R. EVID. 403 provides:
"Although relevant, evidence maybe excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
93. See Gillis, 773 F.2d at 554 ("[I]n determining whether to allow an expert to testify
to the facts underlying an opinion, the court must inquire whether, under Fed. R. Evid. 403, the
testimony should be excluded because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice."); 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 705.05 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1999) ("A
court has authority to limit questioning if, on balance, the probative value of the information is
outweighed by its prejudicial effect under Rule 403 .... "); 29 CHARLESALAN WRIGHT&VICTOR
JAMES GOLD, FEDERALPRACTICEAND PROCEDURE § 6293, at 418 (1997) ("[W]here examination
of an expert may delve into matters that may be confusing, unfairly prejudicial, or a waste of
time, admissibility may be governed by Rule 403."); 2 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURa ETAL., FEDERAL
RuLEs OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 1438 (7th ed. 1998) ("This right [of cross-examination of an
expert] should be subject to limitation under Rules 403 and 611 (a), however.").
94. S.C. R. EVID. 403.
95. Slocumb, 336 S.C. at 631-32, 521 S.E.2d at 513-14.
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expert testimony that was based upon inadmissible evidence and then to deny
the opposing party a proper opportunity to challenge that testimony, because
such a challenge would require the admission of the inadmissible evidence
upon which the expert's opinion is based. The Fourth Circuit further explained
in United States v. A & S Council Oil Co. 96 that "Rule 703 creates a shield by
which a party may enjoy the benefit of inadmissible evidence by wrapping it
in an expert's opinion; Rule 705 is the cross-examiner's sword, and, within
very broad limits, he may wield it as he likes."'97
Thus, in a situation such as that in Slocumb, evidence of the accused's past
bad acts will not be admitted against him unless the accused brings that
evidence into court himself through the use of an expert that has relied upon
those past bad acts in forming his opinion.9' Admittedly, this "fairness"
safeguard does little to assist a defendant like Slocumb in keeping past bad acts
evidence from the jury once he has presented his expert witness. However, this
right to cross-examination does protect the concerns of the Lyle rule by
preventing the abuse of evidence of past bad acts by either side. Typically, a
court applying Rule 705 will bar the prosecution from using other crimes
evidence against the accused unless the accused has opened that door by his
own actions.99 Likewise, the court will not allow the defendant to use other
crimes evidence to bolster his case and then deny the prosecution the
opportunity to challenge the use of that evidence. Rule 705, like Lyle, is
concerned with ensuring that evidence is used in a fair and just manner.
C. Rule 703
While the Slocumb court did not address the issue, several commentators
have suggested that the permission grantedby Rule 703 for experts to rely upon
"facts or data... not admissible in evidence"' 0 is not as broad as one might
suspect. Charles Wright and Victor Gold argue that the rationale for "this
96. 947 F.2d 1128 (4th Cir. 1991).
97. Id. at 1135.
98. The court in Gillis similarly relied upon this "live by the sword, die by the sword"
fairness argument, noting that:
the entire area of questioning [of the other crimes the
defendant's expert used to form his opinion] could
easily have been avoided by the [defendant] .... [as]
[t]he court had prohibited the government from
eliciting this testimony in its case-in-chief, and had
warned [the defendant] of the dangers of opening the
door by asking Dr. Custer's diagnosis.
Gillis, 773 F.2d at 554.
99. See Gillis, 773 F.2d at 554; Slocumb, 336 S.C. at 629, 521 S.E.2d at 512-13. In
both cases, the court refused to allow the prosecution to elicit the other crimes evidence in its
case-in-chief, but did allow such evidence to come in on cross-examination of a defense expert
witness.
100. S.C. R. EVID. 703.
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aspect of Rule 703 is that experts in the field can be presumed to know when
evidence is sufficiently trustworthy and probative to merit reliance."'01
However, this rationale raises a difficult question of "whether an expert can
give opinion testimony based on evidence excludable under rules rooted in
policies extrinsic to reliability or relevance concerns .... [such as] rules
excluding character evidence, offers to compromise or plead, subsequent
remedial measures, liability insurance, privileged matters, and the like."'0 2
Wright and Gold resolve this question to the exclusion of expert testimony
based on evidence inadmissible under rules founded on policies extrinsic to
reliability, claiming that "[a]ny other reading of Rule 703 brings it into direct
conflict either with those rules or with the interest in providing a fair
opportunity for cross-examination."' 3 Likewise, Michael Graham notes that
[f]acts, data, or opinions reasonably relied upon by the expert
witness in forming his opinion on the subject matter which
have not been admitted into evidence are also subject to
exclusion on the basis of attendant trial concerns .... Thus
facts, data, or opinions which would be inadmissible under,
for example, Rules 404, 405, 608, 609 . . . do not
automatically become admissible if offered solely as forming
part of the basis of an expert witness' opinion under Rule
703.'04
Thus, Rule 703 is implicitly limited by other rules of evidence that may
sometimes, if not always, preclude expert testimony based on evidence
inadmissible under those rules.' 5 Included prominently among such rules is
Rule 404. Accordingly, a court applying this implicit limitation of Rule 703
may, regardless of Rule 403 balancing, disallow expert testimony based on
evidence of past bad acts of the accused if such an admission would
significantly frustrate the policies underlying Rule 404.
D. Limiting Instructions
The most common but least effective safeguard against the improper use
of evidence of past crimes by the jury is the judge's limiting instruction. The
101. 29 WRIGHT & GOLD,supra note 93, § 6273, at 311-12.
102. Id. at 313. The authors specifically mention Rule 404 as such a "rule rooted in
policies extrinsic to reliability and relevance concerns." Id. at 313 n.23.
103. Id. at 316.
104. MICHAELGRAHAM,HAMDBOOKOFFEDERALEVIDENCE § 703.1, at644-45 (3d ed.
1991).
105. See also Bryan v. John Bean Div. of FMC Corp., 566 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1978)
(holding that the conclusions ofnontestifying experts that the testifying experts had relied upon
in forming their opinions were not admissible under Rule 703 and 705 because of hearsay
concerns).
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Slocumb court mentions that "the trial judge instructed the jury that evidence
of bad reputation may not be considered as evidence of guilt" as a part of its
rationale for holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
the evidence of Slocumb's past bad acts."°6 However, other South Carolina
courts have gone further, not merely finding limiting instructions to be relevant
to whether ajudge abused his discretion, but instead holding that the failure of
ajudge to give such a limiting instruction with regard to other crimes evidence
constitutes reversible error under the "general rule.., that when evidence of
other crimes is admitted for a specific purpose, the judge is required to instruct
the jury to limit their consideration of this evidence for the particular purpose
for which it is offered."'' 7 Thus, under South Carolina law, ajudge is generally
required to provide the minimal safeguard of a limiting instruction concerning
the jury's use of evidence of the defendant's past bad acts. In a case such as
Slocumb, a limiting instruction is critical if the jurors are to fully understand
their duty to consider the evidence of the defendant's past bad acts only in their
evaluation of the credibility of the defendant's expert witness, and not for any
other purpose.
These four safeguards-Rule 403's protection against undue prejudice, the
implicit limitation of Rule 705 and Rule 703, and the limiting instruction - are
both sufficiently powerful to guard against any gross violations of the policies
underlying the Lyle rule when evidence of past bad acts is sought to be
introduced under Rule 705 and sufficiently tailored to prevent the significant
infringement of the prosecution's right to cross-examination under that same
rule.
V. CONCLUSION
What, then, to make of the ruling in Slocumb? On one hand, Slocumb
appears to circumvent much of the exclusionary nature of the Lyle rule by mere
reference to Rule 705. Yet, on the other, Slocumb seems to protect against any
egregious infringements of the Lyle rule through a number of effective
evidentiary safeguards. At root, any determination of the ultimate adequacy of
the Slocumb court's resolution of the evidentiary conflict placed before it must
turn on the validity of the court's attempts to define its ruling as beyond the
scope of Lyle.
Given the weight of precedent behind the Lyle rule and its apparent
applicability to the Slocum case, the Slocumb court's discussion of the conflict
between Rule 705 and Lyle seems underdeveloped and overly conclusory. In
many ways, any weaknesses in the court's opinion are not so much the result
106. Slocumb, 336 S.C. at 633, 521 S.E.2d at 514.
107. State v. Timmons, 327 S.C. 48, 54-55, 488 S.E.2d 323, 326 (1997); see also
State v. Warren, 330 S.C. 584,611,500 S.E.2d 128, 142 (Ct. App. 1998) (applying Timmons to
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of faulty legal analysis, but are more akin to a failure of proof. The court
simply did not convincingly rebut the presumptive applicability of LyIe to the
admission of evidence of Slocumb's past bad acts. To be fair, much of this
"failure of proof' stems from the fact that not only was this problem an issue
of first impression in South Carolina, but further, case law and commentary
from other jurisdictions with their broader conception of the admissibility of
evidence of other crimes was of little help to the court in resolving this issue.
Yet, these problems of resolving an issue of first impression demand the sort
of extended, searching analysis that the Slocumb opinion simply does not
undertake. In sum, Slocumb may not be in need of revision or rejection, but it
does certainly need more explanation and justification to sustain the significant
new standards for the admissibility of evidence ofpast bad acts that it proposes.
Justin Werner
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